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Abstract
A method for describing preferences independently of the func­
tional form of utility is developed for log-linearized models and ap­
plied to finding general conditions for indeterminacy in the pres­
ence of externalities. It is shown that if the elasticity of output 
with respect to labor in the social production function is less than 
unity and externalities arise from output then there are no con­
cave utility functions consistent with indeterminacy. Considering 
the same assumption in the more general setting where externali­
ties to labor and capital can be different, we prove that there are 
no utility functions separable in consumption and labor and no 
utility functions in the KPR class consistent with indeterminacy.
These results show that there is an error in Bennett and Farmer 
(JET, 2000), who claimed that indeterminacy could occur with 
low externalities for non-separable preferences of the KPR form. 
Finally, we show that there can be sunspots below the former 
lower bounds, if we continue to allow' for factor-specific externali­
ties in the inputs and consider the admissible parameterspace for 






















































































































































































It1 turns out that the existence of sunspots in a one-sector economy 
depends on the specification of preferences and the way imperfections 
enter the model. We start from a setting where there is no restriction on 
functional forms of preferences whatsoever and where imperfections can 
be due to output externalities or factor-specific input externalities. The 
toolkit for dealing with preferences not restricted by any functional form 
is developed in a note on the Sxy notation in the appendix.
The strategy to find the results presented here was to solve the prob­
lem in its most general form and then use numerical methods, most im­
portantly random searches over the parameter space, that led to guesses 
about theorems that might hold, that were then subject to analytic 
proofs. This turned out to be a very useful way to go and the theo­
rems and their proofs are presented here.
Section 2 defines the model.
In section 3 it is shown that in a steady state, around which the 
stability properties are evaluated, the admissible preference parameters 
are subject to a specific restriction.
In section 4 we prove that under the assumption a  =  am <  1, 
j3 =  bm < 1 (where a  and (3 are the elasticities of output with respect to 
capital and labor in the social production function, a and b are the shares 
of capital and labor in the private production function) there are no con­
cave utility functions that would lead to indeterminacy. This means that 
under empirically plausible assumptions there are no rational expecta­
tions stationary sunspot equilibria when imperfections are modelled as 
externalities in output.
Next, we relax the assumption that social and private partial elas­
ticities of output are related by the same factor of proportionality for 
both capital and labor. That is, we consider a =  an <  1, /? =  bm <  1.
'I  thank Roger Farmer, Thomas Steinberger and the audience in a presentation at 
UCLA for comments. Of course, all remaining errors are my own.



























































































This can be interpreted as imperfections arising from externalities specific 
to the use of inputs in production.
In section 5 we prove that in this more general environment indeter­
minacy is precluded by two standard classes of preferences. One theorem 
relates to separable preferences to other to preferences of the K PR  form.
In section 6 we continue to allow for this more general formulation 
of imperfections. It turns out that there exist parametrizations of utility 
which axe consistent with indeterminacy when a  =  an <  1, (3 =  bm < 
1. We find that, even when there are no externalities in labor, there 
are preferences consistent with indeterminacy if capital externalities are 
high enough, while capital externalities are still too low to allow for 
endogenous growth.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 A  nesting model
The following model nests the models of Benhabib and Farmer (1994) 
and Bennett and Farmer (2000) and will be used to search for a credible 
pure sunspot economy in a more general class of preferences.
The technology is the same as in the two above-mentioned nested 
models. They assume a large number of competitive firms, each of 
which produces a homogenous commodity using a constant-returns-to- 
scale technology.
Y =  K albE , (1)
where a +  b =  1 and E > 0. Each firm takes E  as given, however, in 
practice E  is determined by the activity of other firms. This imperfection 
is modelled by the equation




























































































where K  and I denote economy wide averages. It is further assumed 
that 1 >  a >  a, (3 >  b, and a +  f3 >  1. Combining (1) and (2) we get the 
social production function
K =  K al0. (3)
Factor markets are competitive and factors of production receive 
fixed shares of national income,
wl
b = Y ' (4)
rK
a  =  ~Y '
(5)
where w is the wage rate and r is the rental rate, both measured in 
terms of the consumption good.
Without loss of generality, imperfections are implicitly parametrized 
by the parameters n and to, where n > l , T O > l , n  +  T O > 2, such that2
a =  an,
(5 =  bm.
The representative consumer maximizes the present value of utility
u(c,l)e ptdt,
where u( . , .) is assumed to be concave, 
subject to the budget constraint
2When we let n — m, m can be interpreted as the returns-to-scale parameter; 





























































































K — (r — 6)K  + wl — c,
an initial condition for capital and the usual no Ponzi scheme con­
straint.
We start by setting up the Hamiltonian of the problem:
H  =  u(c, l) +  A [(r — 6) K  +  wl — c].
The necessary and, by the assumption of concavity of u(c, l), suffi­
cient optimality conditions are:
dH _  du{c, l) . A _  0 A =  5u(c, 0
dc dc 
dH du{c, l)





Note that we can combine (4), (6) and (7) to describe the labor 







and using (3) as





In the optimum the co-state variable moves according to:
A =  pA -
dH_
dK






























































































We can substitute from (4) and (5) into the law o f motion for capital 
and get:
K = Y  - 6K - c.
The transversality condition of the problem is
lim e~pTA =  0.
T->  oo
(9) and (10) can be restated as
A
A
=  p +  6 —
aY_
~ K ’
K  Y  .  c
k  =  k ~ 6 - k -
We then define
A =  log A, k — log K,
( 10)
l =  logZ, c =  log c, y =  log Y.
to reformulate the previous system as
A =  p +  6 — aey~k, (11)
k= ey- k - 6 -  ez~k, (12)
which together with fc(0) =  ko and limr-^oo eA-pr =  0, completely 
describes the dynamics of the system. Next, we let hats over variables de­
fine their deviations from the steady state, whose existence we postulate, 




























































































y =  ak 4- 01. (13)
( l  ~h fill fid') l "f" (file ficc) C Vi (14)
A — SccC +  Sdì. (15)
This is where our Sxy parameters, as introduced in the appendix of 
this paper, come in and allow us to work with utility at its most general 
level. (13) comes from the social production function, (14) and (15) come 
from the first-order conditions for labor and consumption.





$  = <t> l 
<p 3
<p2
Then we can approximate
where
-  6) 02^  -  4>i -  <5)































































































and substitute for l, using (14) and (15), by l =  . to give us
a system of the form
where
1 +  Su —  /3 P6ic
Ôçl Ôrr ÔecÔu 4“ ÔelÔle
(20)
~ P  1 + Su -  P +  Pôle - a  -  aôu
1 "b Ôn Ôd ôci Ôcc ôeeôn “b Ôdôic
(21)
Solve for (y  — k'j and f  c — k'j in terms of A and k to get the ex­
pression in (16) with
$  =  -A ~ XB. (22)
We have now arrived at a point where the approximated dynamics 
of the system are fully specified in terms of the parameters of the model, 
by combining (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22).
This puts us into a position to check for determinacy of the dy­
namic equilibrium of the economy. The economy is a sunspot economy 
iff both eigenvalues of J have negative real parts, or equivalently, if the 
determinant of J is positive and the trace of J is negative.
The analytic expressions for the trace and determinant of J  are:
DetJ =  —(p -I- 5(1 — a)) P+6  1— o —6ci+ 6u — (3+0cia —6cc0 + 6 ict3—o6ua {~6Cc Sir-6 CC +06cc+6clàlc)
0 6  ci6
TraceJ =  7 (kc -  6lc) P (p +  £)“  {[<5aAi +  ôœ -  ôd{6lc -  1)] (p +  <5)}+
- 5 ,




























































































3 A  restriction on 6xy in the steady state 
from the symmetry of the Hessian
Consider the definitions of Sa and 6ic, as given in the appendix on the 
8xy notation:
l duc l




Vic =  ô == 'U'lc 
Ui OC Ui





Note that this is the only restriction we can derive from the defini­
tions of 8xy that involves not other expressions than those present in the 
equilibrium conditions.








This yields the steady state solutions:
Y p +  6 
K  ~  a
(26)
c p +  i5(l — a) 






























































































Y  _  p  +  S 
c p +  5(1 — a)













Substituting from (28) on the LHS and using the relationship in 
(25) on the RHS, we have
b (p  +  6 )  _  5d
p +  5(1 — a) 6ic ’
and finally
Sd
b p  +  bS 




4 A  general impossibility theorem and the 
way out
We first consider the case where imperfections in the economy are mod­
elled es externalities in output by3
E  =  Y (32)
3Bars over variables denote economy-wide averages, equal to the representative 




























































































or, equivalently, to fit into the model as defined above, as
(33)
where m >  1, such that
Y  =  K albE (34)
becomes
Y - =  K al0 (35)
D efin ition  1 A utility function u(c, l) is said to satisfy the concavity 
assumption C if and only if the corresponding Sxy parameters satisfy: 
6œ <  0 , Su >  0 , 6cc6u <  6d6lc.4 (See the appendix on the 6xy notation for 
a derivation).
T h eorem  1 Under the assumption a — am <  1, /? =  bm <  1 there exist 
no utility functions u(c, l) satisfying the concavity assumption C that are 
compatible with the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria.
P roo f. For simplicity we introduce the shorthand notation: 6œ =  . 
u, Sa =  v, Su =  w, Sa — x.
(1) Concavity 
Concavity requires 
ux <  kw2 
or kw2 — ux >  0
since k is negative, and u <  0, x >  0, from the concavity assump­
tion, for given u and x  the concavity region in the space of w is the closed 
interval between the roots of the polynomial whose graph is a parabola 
open from below, since k is negative; and existence of a solution is guar­
anteed by u <  0, x >  0.
The bounds are wc=  —yJ^f,Wc =  + y^F -




























































































We show that the trace cannot be negative on the domain of con­
cavity.
Prom the solution of the model above we have
TraceJ =  }  (u — w) (3 (p +  5) — ^  {[ux +  u — v(w — 1)] (p +  5)} +
av6 _ c
T
with r  =  (—ux — u +  Pu +  vw ).
Concavity and the assumption that /? =  bm <  1 can be shown to 
ensure that r  is positive:
Rearranging and using the restriction v =  kw yields 
t  =  —ux +  kw2 — u (l — mb).
Since the concavity condition says that kw2 — ux >  0, and u < 0. 
and we have assumed mb <  1, positivity of r  follows.
Hence, the negativity of the trace can be expressed as
(u — w)mb(p +  6) — n[ux +  u — v(w — 1)] (p +  5) +  navS — t6 <  0.
We substitute for v =  kw and rearrange to get
—u {x  [np +  (n — 1) 6] +  6{n — 1) +  p(n — m b)}— wb(p+6)(m —n)+  
w2k[np +  (n — 1)5] <  0.
For any given values of all the parameters except w, the LHS is 
a quadratic function in w. Given that u <  0 ,x >  0 (by concavity), 
p >  0, 6 >  0, n >  l, mb <  1 we see that the value at w =  0 (the 
intercept) is positive and that the coefficient of w2 is negative, such that 
the graph of the LHS is a parabola open from below.
Consider now the case m =  n :
The trace condition becomes
—u {x  [mp +  (m — 1) 5] +  <5(m — 1) +  m p(l — b)} + w 2k[mp+  (to — 
1)5] <  0.
Note that the term linear in w has cancelled, such that the graph 
of the parabola is now symmetric in w. It is this symmetry that is crucial 




























































































We will show that at no point of the concavity domain the above 
condition can hold. Because of the graph of the LHS is a symmetric 
parabola open from below and the concavity domain is also symmetric 
in w, we can establish positivity of the LHS on the entire concavity 
domain, by considering its values at w — 0 and at the border of the 
concavity domain.
The value of the LHS at w =  0 is —u {x  [mp +  (m — 1) 6] +  S(m — 1) +  m p(l — 6) 
which is positive, since u <  0, x >  0 (by concavity), p >  0,6 >  0, mb <  1.
The value of the LHS at the borders o f the domain of concavity, 
that is at w =  ± y ^ ,  is — u[8(n—l )+ m p ( l  — 6)], which is unambiguously 
positive too. So, the trace condition cannot be satisfied for concave utility 
functions if m =  n. ■
The proof of this theorem also gives the intuition of how to find 
parametrizations of the economy that lead to indeterminacy. Relaxing 
the restriction m =  n, and letting m and n differ by a high enough value, 
the parabola will lose its symmetry in w and shift. If the shift in some 
direction is big enough the trace condition can be satisfied on the domain 
of concavity. This is the idea behind the results below in section 6.
This result implies that Benhabib and Farmer (1994) hit the lower 
bound of externalities in production required for indeterminacy, by re­
quiring 6m >  1 for a standard utility function that is logarithmic in 
consumption and additively separable in labor, where disutility of labor 
is linear. There are no other concave utility functions that would be com­
patible with indeterminacy for lower levels of the externality parameter 
m, when imperfections are modelled as externalities in production.
The plausibility of assuming 6m >  1 was put into question by 
empirical work. Basu and Fernald (1997) estimated m =  1.09, meaning 
that the inequality would not hold for reasonable values of the labor-share 
parameter 6.
Bennett and Farmer (2000) claimed to have shown that indeter­
minacy can occur for lower levels of the output externality by assuming 
preferences in a more general class utility functions of the so-called KPR 




























































































dition which generalizes the condition of Benhabib and Farmer (1994). 
The latter required the slope of the labor demand curve to be greater 
than the slope of the constant consumption labor supply curve. The 
more recent condition of Bennett and Farmer (2000) required the slope 
of the labor demand curve to be greater than the slope of the Frisch 
labor supply curve.5This condition is nested in the solution above. It 
guarantees that the denominator of the determinant is negative, i.e. 
r  =  (SccSu — 6cc +  p6cc +  5d8ic) <  0, or equivalently /? — 1 > 6u —
Note that the LHS is the slope of the log-approximated labor demand 
curve and the RHS is the slope of the log-approximated Frisch labor sup­
ply curve as derived in the appendix on the 8xy notation. Hence, the 
condition is correct but cannot be applied to cases where /3 =  mb <  1, 
since then the negativity of the LHS would require negativity of the RHS. 
However, as shown in the appendix on the'5ly notation, the slope of the 
Frisch labor supply curve is negative if and only if the utility function 
u(c, l) is not concave.6
5 Factor-specific externalities and standard 
utility functions
We now allow for the possibility that externalities are specific to the 
factors of production.7 This corresponds to modelling
5The Frisch labor supply curve coincides with the constant consumption labor 
supply curve in the case of a utility function that is logarithmic in consumption and 
separable in labor, which explains the generalization achieved by Bennett and Farmer 
(2000). This can readily be seen from the propositions on Frisch labor supply and 
constant consumption labor supply in the appendix on the Sxy notation.
®Bennett and Farmer (2000) calibrate k =  — 1. However, it was shown above that 
k is determined by parameters of the model by the assumption of a steady state such 
that there is no room for further calibration. For 0 < b < l , p > 0 ,  <5 >  0, fc is always 
greater than — 1.
'Factor-specific externalities are proposed and motivated by Harrison and Weder 
(forthcoming), who also check for the relative importance of scale economies from la­
bor and capital. However, they require utility to be logarithmic in consumption and 





























































































where n >  1 ,m >  1, n +  m >  2, such that 
Y =  K albE
becomes
Y  =  K anlbm =  K al0.
5.1 Separable preferences preclude indeterminacy
T h eorem  2 There are no preferences described by the class of utility 
functions
u (c,l) =  U ( c ) - V ( l ) ,  (39)
U'(c) >  0, U"(c) <  0, V'(l) >  0, V"(l) >  0,
which are compatible with indeterminacy if 0  — bm <  l, a =  an <
1.
P roo f. Let the preference parameters be defined as
6̂  — —r <  0,
6u =  X >  0.
The assumption of additive separability of utility in consumption and 
labor is reflected in 6d =  0, <5;c =  0.
The dynamic system from the model as solved above is indetermi­
nate iff its trace is negative and the determinant is positive.
Consider the trace:
TraceJ = - ( 6̂ -  5lc) 0 (p  +  6) — — { [ 5 ^ ;  + 6̂ -  6d(Sic -  1)] (p +  6) } + ^ - - 6, 
r  ar r
nalities associated with labor that generate indeterminacy in the one-sector model.
Below we find that in a general setting, where we do not restrict preferences to be 
representable by standard classes of utility functions, we can well have indeterminacy 
with externalities in capital only.






























































































where r  =  ( - 6^611 -  8cc + 138̂  +  8d8ic) .
In the case of separability, with 8d =  0 and 8ic =  0, this becomes:
TraceJ =  -8^/3 (p +  8) - — 8^(1 +  8u) (p +  8) -  8, 
t ar
T = 8cc ( 0 -  1 -  <5(1) , 
which we can combine to
TraceJ =  ^ ( p  +  8) +  — —--------— (1 +  8u) (p +  8) -  8.1 +  On -  P a (1 +  8u — p)
For indeterminacy this expression needs to be negative:
TraceJ =  (p +  8) ----- -z \ - (1 +  8U) -  /?] -  8 <  0
1 +  On — p la J
Above we assumed that /? — 1 <  0, or 1 — (3 >  0. <5;; >  0, by concavity. 
q =  an, so 2 =  n >  1. Hence, the inequality above cannot hold, meaning 
that indeterminacy requires non-separable utility if /? <  1. ■
5.2 K PR preferences preclude indeterminacy
T h eorem  3 There are no preferences described by the class of utility 
functions, as specified in King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988),
c1-ff
u[c,l) =  ------- v(l), for o >  0, o  7̂  1
1 — a
u(c,l) =  log c — v(l), for a =  1 
which are compatible with indeterminacy if (3 =  bm <  1, a  =  an <
1.
P roo f. Substituting the utility function into the definition of the 8xy 
parameters, we find the restriction imposed on preference parameters by 
this functional form of utility. KPR preferences imply 8ic =  1 +  8̂ . We 
reintroduce the shorthand notation 8̂  =  u,8d =  v, 8ic =  w, 8a — x. In 




























































































Consider the domain of concavity: ux <  kw2 *, which then becomes
x >fci i±2di.— U
We show that DetJ =  ~ (p+ 6( l —  
cannot be positive.
Given concavity and the assumption mb <  1. r  =  (—SccSu — Scc 4- 06^ +  bdbic) 
is unambiguously positive. Hence, 1 — a — Sd +  8a — 0  +  Srjo. — 8^0 +
8iJ3 — aSu would have to be negative. We show that this cannot be the 
case. Rearrange the previous expression to get
—/?(1 +  See — Sic) +  (1 -  cr)(l — Sd +  Su) <  0
By the KPR restriction, the first term drops out:
—0[1 +  u — (1 +  u)] +  (1 — a)[ l  — fc(l +  u) +  x] < 0
Since a <  1, by assumption, we are left with
1 — k — ku +  x <  0. We substitute for x  by its lower limit on the 
concavity domain:
1 — k(l +  u) +  <  0, simplify to obtain
u +  k( 1 +  u) >  0, substituting for k we get
up(l — b) — b(p+S) >  0, which cannot hold, given u <  0 (concavity),
0 <  b < l , p >  0,5 >  0. ■
The previous two theorems show that even if we relax the assump­
tion that m =  n, we cannot find indeterminacy in economies where 
mb <  1 in two standard classes of utility functions, namely the sepa­
rable class and the KPR class.8
®KPR preferences were derived by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) to make a
neoclassical accumulation economy with labor-leisure choice compatible with steady
state growth. Rebelo (1991) points out another way to make an economy with ex­
ogenous growth compatible with labor-leisure choice. This is by the assumption of
utility depending on the state of technology 5  by u(c, IS). It is this way that can be
followed in order to make non-KPR preferences, like the parametrizations that lead




























































































6 Factor-specific externalities and general 
parametrized preferences
Given the solution of the model and its stability properties as summarized 
in DetJ  and TraceJ, it can be checked whether there are parametriza- 
tions of the economy that lead to indeterminacy when allowing for weaker 
assumptions than in the three non-existence theorems above. For given 
values of a,b,p ,6, we search over the space of admissible values of the 
externality parameters m and n, and the space of the preference parame­
ters 6xy for combinations that lead to indeterminacy and satisfy the other 
assumptions of the model (e.g. concavity of u{c,l)).
The results presented here are for values of a =  0.3, b =  0.7, p =  
0.065,6 =  0.1.9 In the parameter space of preferences we consider (&cc&icfiu) € 
D =  { [ -1 0 ,0 ] x [-15,15] x [0,10]}.10
It turns out that by allowing for both factor-specific externalities 
and more general preferences than in the standard classes considered 
above there are economies with a =  an <  1, /? =  bm <  1 that have 
stationary sunspot equilibria.
Thus, in contrast and complementary to, the previous three non­
existence theorems we can state the following positive existence theorem:
T h eorem  4 There are preferences11, as parametrized by 6xy, and values 
for the externality parameters m and n, satisfying a =  an < l, (3 =
9This benchmark calibration is also used by Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and 
Bennett and Farmer (2000).
10Note that in the KPR case — 6CC corresponds to the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, a, and that in the separable case 6u defines the curvature of disutility of 
labor. The box above thus is wide enough to contain parametrizations of utility that 
are usually considered reasonable. The range along the i5dimension then guarantees 
that we take into account the entire concave domain for given Scc and Su.
n The three theorems above are about non-existence. Preferences are represented 
by the utility function u(c,l) from which we derive (unique) parameters Sxy, the only 
properties of utility that matter for our problem. Hence, having shown that there exist 
no Sxy consistent with indeterminacy, it was clear that there are no utility functions 
and preferences consistent with indeterminacy.




























































































bm <  1 such that the model is indeterminate and, hence, stationary 
sunspot equilibria exist. In particular, indeterminacy can occur without 
any externality in labor, i.e. m =  1, when the externality in capital is 
high enough.
Figure 1 shows combinations of the labor externality parameter, m, 
and the capital externality parameter, n, for which we could find admissi­
ble preference parameters in the box D  consistent with indeterminacy.12 
We see that there are no hits on the dashed line, corresponding to the 
case of an output externality, where m =  n. This corresponds to The­
orem 1, proven analytically above. Moving away from the dashed line, 
we can find combinations of the labor and capital externality, satisfying 
the assumption a =  an <  1, /3 =  bm <  1, that are consistent with inde­
terminacy for some triple (bacfiicfiu) belonging to D. Note that Theorem 
2 and Theorem 3 tell us that these 6xy cannot result from preferences 
described by utility functions of the separable or the KPR form.
It shows that indeterminacy can hold when there are externalities 
to just one of the factors. The case without externalities in the labor
are Sxy parameters, derived from utility, consistent with indeterminacy. We must then 
make sure that we can map back the Sxy we found into an appropriate utility function 
describing the preferences of the representative agent. Since the Sxy are defined (see 
the appendix) in terms of steady state levels of c  and l and first and second partial 
derivatives of u(c, l) evaluated at this point, this is, in principle, a problem of solving 
a system of second-order partial differential equations. We can take the steady state 
levels of c and l as given and also take the first partial derivatives as given, in order 
to match any given real wage. By the steady state restriction from the symmetry of 
the Hessian, as derived above, there are three free Sxy parameters. We can obtain the 
value of each triple by adjusting the second partial derivatives (the elements of the 
Hessian) accordingly. This means that the existence of Sxy parameters implies the 
existence of an appropriate utility function representing preferences.
12The search over D was implemented in a way such that the points at which a 
check for determinancy was performed are distributed uniformly over D. For each point 
(m, n)on the grid of labor and capital externalities up to a millon triads over D were 
done. At each (m,n) the random search was stopped as soon as the first hit had 
occurred. This combination of random search and stopping rule proved quite useful 
since it helped speeding up the computations to get results all the points on the grid 




























































































input seems particularly interesting. A capital externality that is not 
strong enough to allow for endogenous growth can be sufficiently high to 
lead to endogenous cycles, while not requiring any further imperfection in 
the economy. We found hits both above and below the dashed line, where 
m = n. Using the propositions in the appendix about the properties of 
Sxy preference parameters, it turned out that all the hits with m > n 
implied that both consumption and leisure were normal goods; whereas 
for all hits with m < n consumption was a normal good and leisure an 
inferior good.
Figure 1: Combinations (n, m) leading to indeterminacy for some 8xy
In the next two figures we restrict attention to specific points in the 
externality space, but instead have a closer look at the preference space. 
Related work points out the importance of two labor market equations for 
indeterminacy in models that are special cases of the model considered 
here. Benhabib and Farmer (1994) show that the slope of the constant 
consumption labor supply curve is crucial for the indeterminacy. Bennett 
and Farmer (2000) emphasize the role of the Frisch labor supply curve. 
In the appendix it is shown how to express these curves in terms of the Sxy 




























































































into a well-known framework.
For the combinations m =  land n =  1.5, m =  land n =  2, m =  
land n =  3, we checked each point on a grid of step-size 0.1 in the box D 
of preference parameters, as defined above, for indeterminacy. The hits 
obtained in the preference space were then mapped into the coefficients 
of the following two equations, derived in the appendix:
The approximated constant consumption labor supply curve:
Figure 2 expresses the preference parameters that led to indeter­
minacy in terms of the coefficients of the constant consumption labor 
supply curve.
We see that the region of coefficients in the constant consumption 
labor supply curve that corresponds to preference parameters leading 
to indeterminacy increases considerably in size as we increase capital 
externalities from n =  1.5 (for which we use solid squares) to n =  3 (for 
which we use pluses), while having no labor externality in the model. 
The constant consumption labor supply curve slopes up in all the cases. 
As shown in the appendix, a downward sloping curve would imply that 
consumption is an inferior good.
In Figure 3 the preference parameters that led to indeterminacy are 
represented in terms of the coefficients of the Frisch labor supply curve.
Again, we see how the indeterminacy region gets larger as we let 
the capital externality increase in a model without labor externality. It 
is important to point out that the coefficient on labor is positive in all 
the cases. As shown in the appendix, a downward sloping would mean 
non-concave utility.
w =  constant +  (6u — 5d) l +  (<5;c — 6&) c. (40)
The approximated Frisch labor supply curve:
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We conclude that, by considering preferences which are logarithmic in 
consumption and additively separable in labor, and hence also belong to 
the KPR class, Benhabib and Farmer (1994) hit three lower bounds on 
the degree of imperfections required for a sunspot economy. This follows 
from the theorems, which state non-existence of indeterminacy for levels 
of the externality below the level they found. The lowest level of the 
output externality m =  n such that indeterminacy can exist for any 
concave utility function is just high enough to make bm > 1 hold true. 
The lowest level of the labor externality m consistent with indeterminacy 
for any separable utility function is just high enough to make bm > 1 
hold true. Similarly, the lowest level of the labor externality m consistent 
with indeterminacy for any KPR utility function is just high enough to 
make bm >  1 hold true. The first and the third statement are in contrast 
to Bennett and Farmer (2000).
The models considered in the first three theorems differ in terms 
of flexibility in two respects: In Theorem 1 there is no restriction to 
any certain functional form of utility but at require externalities to be 
due to output, or m =  n. In Theorem 2 and in Theorem 3 we relax 
the assumption on externalities by admitting factor-specific externalities, 
where m can be different from n, considering two specific classes of utility 
functions. We proved that none of these settings is compatible with 
indeterminacy under our assumptions.
We have shown that by allowing for more flexibility in both mod­
elling imperfections and preferences we can find sunspot economies below 
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A  Appendix : Describing preferences us­
ing the 8xy notation
It has turned out that in log-linearized versions o f models only the fol­
lowing 6xy parameters of utility matter:
Let the utility function be given by U (c, L), where the arguments 
are consumption and leisure, justifying the assumption that both dUgĈ  
and dUglL'> are positive. In the appendix the same framework is applied 
to the case when the second argument of utility is labor instead of leisure.





U l=  dL
(43)
r r  02U(C, L) .
Ucc~  dc*
(44)
r r  &U{C,L) 
UcL= dcdL
(45)
r r  d2U(C,L) 
U u =  dLdc
(46)
r r  d2U(c, L)
Ull dL2 (47)
c dUc c 
: _  H i t e  ~  W c
(48)
L dUc L 
Uc d L ~  Uc
(49)
c dUL c TT 
~ UL dc _  UL Lc
(50)
L dUL L 





























































































The definition tells us that the Sxy can be interpreted as the elas­
ticities of marginal utility. It seems worth pointing out that the 6xy are 
not invariant with respect to monotonic transformations of the utility 
function.
Properties of the utility function and of what it implies can be 
formulated using the 6xy notation:
A .l Concavity
The following proposition gives a condition in terms of Sxy that translates 
into concavity as a local property of the utility function.
P rop osition  5 The utility function U(c, L) is concave if and only if Sec, 
Sll <  0 and
SccSll >  ScLSLc. (52)




The function U(c, L) is concave if and only if H  is negative semidef- 
inite. To check for negative semidefiniteness we have to consider the 
principal minors of H. The following conditions must hold:
a) Uœ <  0; rearranging the definition of 6œ and using the assump­
tion that Uc >  0 we get 6̂  <  0.
b) U n  <  0: rearranging the definition of 6ll and using the assump­
tion that Ul >  0 we get 6ll <  0.
c) UcJJll — ULcUcL >  0; substituting for Uxy from the definitions 
of 6xy we get
Ul





























































































The condition in the proposition follows immediately, using the 
assumption that Uc, Ul >  0 .1
A .2 Quasiconcavity
P rop osition  6 a) If 6cl >  0 (and hence also 6lc >  0) and
- 1 <$cc 1 6LL
2 6Z 2 l l '
then U(c, L) is quasiconcave; conversely if U(c, L) is quasiconcave 
then the above inequality holds weakly.
b) If 5cl < 0  (and hence also Slc <  0) and
l ^ c  1 h t  
2 Su  2 8cL ’
(56)
then U (c, L) is quasiconcave; conversely if U (c, L) is quasiconcave 
then the above inequality holds weakly.
c) If 8cl =  0 (and hence also 6lc — 0) and
8cc< 0 ,6 l l < 0 ,  (57)
with at least one of the inequalities holding strictly, then U(c, L) is 
quasiconcave.
Proof: We consider the bordered Hessian, H, defined as
‘ 0 Uc Ul ‘
H = Uc Ucc UcL
. Ul ULc Ull .
(58)
If the determinant o f H is positive, then U(c, L) is quasiconcave. 
Conversely, if U(c, L) is quasiconcave then the determinant is >  0.




























































































UcUcLUL +  ULUcULc -  UlUccUl -  ULLUCUC >  0. (59)
Rearranging and using the definitions of 6xy we get
(60)
The result in c) follows from this stage of the proof.
Assuming Uu >  0, and using the symmetry of the Hessian and the 
definitions 8xy again, yields the result in a).
The result in b) is obtained analogously by assuming Ulc =  Ucl < 
0, which implies 8ic < 0, dci  <  0.B
A. 3 Inferiority
P rop osition  7 Leisure is an inferior good if and only if
Proof: We maximize U(c,L), such that c +  wL =  B, which leads 
to the following system of equations:
(61)
B — c — wL — 0
Uc -  A =  0 




Totally differentiating we get:
— ldX 4* Uccdc +  UcLdL =  0 
—wdX +  Uudc + UndL =  Xdw






























































































This provides the basis for the use of the implicit function theorem 
in several dimensions in the following:
’ 0 —1 —w
- 1  Ucc UCL 
. —W Ulc UlL .
We then apply Cramer’s rule to get
dL_
dB V\
o -1  -1




where | J\ denotes the determinant of the matrix on the left-hand 
side of the previous equation.
dL _  Ulc — wUcc
dB wUcL +  wULc -  w2Ucc -  ULl
We then use the first order conditions to replace w by jf- .
dL ULc ~ fyUcc
(71)
dB ~ %UcL +  % U Lc- ( % ) 2 U cc-U LL
dL Ulc -  fyUcc
(72)
dB i t  ( ULc -  ftUcc) +  fyUcL -  ULL
Simplify and impose inferiority:
dL _  1
dB ĵ Ucl-Ull
n_ T  ,, u, ,,
Ul t£U cL -  ULL 






























































































Now use the definitions of 6xy and simplify to get
(76)
where the double fraction can again be replaced using the defini­
tions of 6xy, giving the result stated in the proposition.®
P rop osition  8 Consumption is an inferior good if and only if
Proof: The proof is analogous to the one for inferiority of leisure. 
The symmetry between consumption and leisure leads to the symmetry 
between the two inferiority conditions.®
A .4 Constant consumption leisure demand
Let tildes over variables denote their logarithms. Start from the first 
order condition
&Lc ^cc &Lc
$cL ~  &LL &cL
(77)
(78)
UL — Uc — w (79)
Totally differentiating we get:



























































































Using the definitions of 6xy we get
{Sll ~ 6cl) dL +  (5Lc -  Sa) dc. =  dw, (81)
leading to the following
P rop osition  9 The constant consumption leisure demand curve can be 
approximated by
w =  constant +  (6LL -  6cL) L +  (ôLc -  5œ) c. (82)
A .5 Frisch leisure demand
The Frisch demand curve corresponds to the demand curve holding con­
stant the marginal utility of consumption.
Start from the first order condition, let again tildes denote loga­
rithms of variables.
Uc =  A (83)
II (84)
In the same style as in the constant consumption case above the 
last equation is totally differentiated as:
beede +  6CLdL =  d\, (85)
which can be solved for dc and substituted into (81) to yield the 
following





























































































w =  constant +   ̂Sll — ĉ̂ Lc ĵ L 4. — 1̂  A. (86)
A .6 Some corollaries
We are now in a position to harvest some corollaries on the propositions 
made.
C orollary  11 If SLL <  0, as is usually assumed and required for con­
cavity, we must have 6ci  < 0 for constant consumption leisure demand 
to slope up.
Proof: The result follows immediately, when considering the slope 
coefficient of leisure in the (approximated) constant consumption leisure 
demand curve.■
C orollary  12 If constant consumption leisure demand slopes up and 
utility is quasiconcave then consumption is a non-normal good.








2 <5 LcScL SrrSr ' &LC&LL
(6cl — Sll) Scl
<  0. (88)
We can use the previous corollary to concentrate on the case 6cl < 
0. Upward sloping constant consumption leisure demand implies from 
(82) that 6cl — Sll <  0. Therefore the denominator is positive. Nonpos­
itivity of the numerator is assured by quasiconcavity, as given in (56).■





























































































Proof: Assume 6^ < 0 and rearrange the condition for upward 
sloping Frisch leisure demand, as given by
SLL -  ~ -  >  0. (89)
Occ
<5cĉ ll < Scl6lc (90)
This is the opposite of the concavity condition in (52).■
A .7 Using labor instead of leisure in the utility func­
tion
The utility function now is u(c, l), where we assume that dUgCc1̂ >  0 and
du(c,l) n
ai u- 





U i=  dl
(92)
d2u(c, l) 
U~ =  dc2
(93)
d2u(c, l) 
Ud ~  dcdl
(94)
d2u(c, l) 
Ulc ~  dldc
(95)
d2u(c, l) 
Uu ~  dl2
(96)
c duc c
0Cc =  o =: 'Occ Uc OC Uc
(97)
c l duc l
Ocl oi — Ocl Uc Ol Uc
(98)
c dui c





























































































l dui l 
on =  — 37 =  —uu ui at ui
P rop os ition  14 The utility function u(c, l) is concave if and only if 
Sec <  0, Su >  0 and
SeeSu < S d S lc - (1 0 1 )
The proof is analogous to the one above in the case of leisure. 
P rop os ition  15 a) If Sd >  0, and hence 6ic <  0, and
Î OO 1
2S,c +  2 6d ’
( 102)
then u(c, l) is quasiconcave; conversely ifu(c , l) is quasiconcave then 
the above inequality holds weakly.
b) If Sd < 0, and hence Sic > 0, and
i >  +  h —
2 Su +  28d ’
(103)
then u(c, l) is quasiconcave; conversely ifu (c , l) is quasiconcave then 
the above inequality holds weakly.
c) If Sd =  0 (and hence also Su — 0) and
6 cc< 0 ,6 u > 0 ,  (104)
with at least one of the inequalities holding strictly, then u(c, l) is 
quasiconcave.
The proof is analogous to the one above in the case of leisure. 
P rop os ition  16 Leisure is an inferior good if and only if






























































































The proof is analogous to the one above in the case of leisure.
P rop os ition  17 Consumption is an inferior good if and only if
file &cc ^  Slc
6d — Su 6d
(106)
The proof is analogous to the one above in the case of leisure.
P rop os ition  18 The constant consumption labor supply curve can be 
approximated by
w =  constant +  (6n — 6d) l +  (5;c — bcc) c. (107)
The derivation is the same as in the case o f leisure demand.
P rop os ition  19 The Frisch labor supply curve can be approximated by
w =  constant +  ^6u-----  ̂ — 1̂  A. (108)
The derivation is the same as in the case of leisure demand.
The corollaries can be reformulated using labor instead of leisure; 
the proofs are analogous to those above.
C oro lla ry  20 If 6u >  0. as is usually assumed and required for concav­
ity, we must have 6  ̂ > 0 for constant consumption labor supply to slope 
down.
C oro lla ry  21 If constant consumption labor supply slopes down and 
utility is quasiconcave then consumption is a non-normal good.
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